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Abstract: The need for security in communications is in fact not new. This
need has existed in military communications for thousands of years. In this
paper, we focus on network protocols that provide security services. Wireless
sensor network is an emerging technology that shows applications both for
public as well as military purposes. Monitoring is one of the main applications.
A large amount of redundant data is generated by sensor nodes. This paper
compares all the protocols which are designed for security of wireless sensor
network on the basis of security services and propose an improved protocol
that reduces communication overhead by removing data redundancy from the
network. By using the message sequence number we can check whether it
is old message or new message. If the message is old then no need to send
that message thereby reducing overhead. It also integrates security by data
freshness in the protocol.
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1 Introduction
Sensor networks are typically data driven, i.e., the whole network cooperates in communicat-
ing data from sensors (information sources) to information sinks. Low-cost, low power, multifunc-
tional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicate untethered in short distances have
been developed due to the recent advances in wireless communication. These tiny sensors have
the ability of sensing, data processing, and communicating with each other. Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN) which rely on collaborative work of large number of sensors are realized. A
WSN is a wireless network consisting of spatially distributed autonomous devices using sensors
to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, vi-
bration, pressure, motion or pollutants, at diﬀerent locations. In addition to one or more sensors,
each node in a sensor network is typically equipped with a radio transceiver or other wireless
communications device, a small microcontroller, and an energy source, usually a battery. A
sensor network normally constitutes a wireless ad-hoc network, meaning that each sensor sup-
ports a multi-hop routing algorithm. Wireless sensor network is one of the most exciting and
challenging research areas.
Nodes in sensor networks have restricted storage, computational and energy resources; these
restrictions place a limit on the types of deployable routing mechanisms. Additionally, ad hoc
routing protocols for conventional wireless networks support IP style addressing of sources and
destinations. They also use intermediate nodes to support end-to-end communication between
arbitrary nodes in the network. It is possible for any-to-any communication to be relevant in a
sensor network; however this approach may be unsuitable as it could generate unwanted traﬃc
in the network, thus, results the extra usage of already limited node resources. Many-to-one
communication paradigm is widely used in regards to sensor networks since sensor nodes send
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their data to a common sink node for processing. This many-to-one paradigm also results in
non-uniform energy drainage in the network.
The applications for WSNs are many and varied, but typically involve some kind of monitor-
ing, tracking, and controlling, intelligent buildings, transportation, space exploration, disaster
detection. In order to operate these applications successfully, it is necessary to maintain privacy
and security of the transmitted data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains security requirements, section
3 presents a review of the relevant work, section 4 presents the proposed protocol, section 5 shows
the results and discussion, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Security Requirements
2.1 Conﬁdentiality
Conﬁdentiality means keeping information secret from unauthorized parties. A sensor net-
work should not leak sensor readings to neighboring networks. The conﬁdentiality objective is
required in sensors environment to protect information traveling between the sensor nodes of
the network or between the sensors and the base station from disclosure, since an adversary
having the appropriate equipment may eavesdrop on the communication. By eavesdropping, the
adversary could overhear critical information such as sensing data and routing information.
2.2 Authentication
In a sensor network, an adversary can easily inject messages, so the receiver needs to make
sure that the data used in any decision-making process originates from the correct source. As
in conventional systems, authentication techniques verify the identity of the participants in a
communication, distinguishing in this way legitimate users from intruders. In the case of sensor
networks, it is essential for each sensor node and base station to have the ability to verify that the
data received was really sent by a trusted sender and not by an adversary that tricked legitimate
nodes into accepting false data. If such a case happens and false data are supplied into the
network, then its behavior could not be predicted, and most of the times the mission of WSN
will not be accomplished as expected.
2.3 Integrity
Data integrity ensures the receiver that the received data is not altered in transit by an adver-
sary. Lack of integrity could result in many problems since the consequences of using inaccurate
information could be disastrous, for example, for the healthcare sector where lives are endan-
gered. Integrity controls must be implemented to ensure that information is not altered in any
unexpected way.
2.4 Freshness
One of the many attacks launched against sensor networks is the message replay attack where
an adversary may capture messages exchanged between nodes and replay them later to cause
confusion to the network. Data freshness implies that the data is recent, and it ensures that
an adversary has not replayed old messages. To achieve freshness, network protocols must be
designed in a way to identify duplicate packets and discard them preventing potential mix-up.
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2.5 Availability
Availability ensures that services and information can be accessed at the time they are re-
quired. In sensor networks there are many risks that could result in loss of availability such
as sensor node capturing and denial of service attacks. The availability of a sensor and sensor
network may decrease for the following reasons [1]:
 Additional computation consumes additional energy. If no more energy exists, the data
will no longer be available.
 Additional communication also consumes more energy. Besides, as communication power
increases so does the chance of a communication conﬂict or interference. A single point
failure exists if we use the central point scheme such as a single sink or gateway. This
greatly threatens the availability of the network.
3 Related Work
The various protocols which have been proposed for security in wireless sensor network by
various authors are SPIN, LEAP, TINYSEC, ZIGBEE, SM. In SPIN (Sensor Protocols for In-
formation via Negotiation), nodes use three types of messages ADV, REQ and DATA to com-
municate. ADV is used to advertise new data, REQ to request for data and DATA is the actual
message itself. The protocol starts when a SPIN node obtains new data that it is willing to share.
It does so by broadcasting an ADV message containing meta-data. If a neighbor is interested
in the data, it sends an REQ message for the DATA and the DATA is sent to this neighbor
node. The neighbor sensor node then repeats this process to its neighbors as a result of which
the entire sensor area will get a copy. It consists of two secure building blocks SNEP (Sensor
Network Encryption Protocol) and ÎźTESLA (Timed Eﬃcient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentica-
tion). In addition to integrity, SNEP is used to provide conﬁdentiality through encryption and
authentication using a message authentication code (MAC). It lowers communication overhead
adding only 8 bytes per message [2]. TESLA authenticates the initial packet using the digital
signature. For an authenticated packet to be sent, the base station computes a MAC on the
packet with the key that is secret at that point in time. When a node gets a packet, it can
conﬁrm that the base station did not yet disclose the corresponding MAC key [3].
The goal of LEAP (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol) is to satisfy the
security properties of authentication and conﬁdentiality in a wireless environment where the
intruder may eavesdrop, inject packets, and replay messages [4]. LEAP, as a key management
protocol for sensor networks, is designed to support in-network processing, while restricting the
impact of a compromised node to the network. In order to support the in-network processing
necessary for most applications of these networks while at the same time providing security
properties, such as security and authentication, similar to those of pairwise symmetric keys,
LEAP speciﬁes four types of keys: individual keys, pairwise shared keys, cluster keys and group
keys. Individual keys are symmetric keys shared between the base station and each of the nodes.
For example, a node might use the individual key to notify the base station of a suspicious
neighbor. Pairwise shared keys are symmetric keys shared between a node and each of its
neighbors. While pairwise shared keys are used to establish cluster keys, they prevent passive
participation which is desirable for in-network processing. Cluster keys are symmetric keys shared
between a node and all of its neighbors. These cluster keys can be used for locally broadcast
messages such as a routing protocol might use and are also used for updating the group key.
The group key, a symmetric key shared between the base station and all of the nodes, allows
encrypted and authenticated messages to broadcast through the whole network.
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In the next protocol, TINY SEC, the dominant traﬃc pattern in sensor networks is many-to-
one, with many sensor nodes communicating sensor readings or network events over a multihop
topology to a central base station. However, neighboring nodes in sensor networks often witness
the same or correlated environmental events, and if each node sends a packet to the base station
in response, precious energy and bandwidth are wasted. To prune these redundant messages
to reduce traﬃc and save energy, sensor networks use in-network processing such as aggrega-
tion and duplicate elimination [5, 6]. Since in-network processing requires intermediate nodes
to access, modify, and suppress the contents of messages, it is unlikely we can use end-to-end
security mechanisms between each sensor node and the base station to guarantee the authen-
ticity, integrity, and conﬁdentiality of these messages. With authenticated encryption, TinySec
encrypts the data payload and authenticates the packet with a MAC [7]. Single shared global
cryptographic key, link layer encryption and integrity protection cryptography is based on a
block cipher. TinySec is a research platform that is easily extensible and has been incorporated
into higher level protocols.
In ZIGBEE, the concept of a Trust Center is introduced in the speciﬁcation. Generally the
ZigBee coordinator performs this duty. This trust center allows other devices to join the network
and also distributes the keys. There are three roles played:
 trust manager, whereby authentication of devices requesting to join the network is done,
 network manager, maintaining and distributing network keys, and
 conﬁguration manager, enabling end-to-end security between devices [8].
It operates in both Residential Mode and Commercial Mode. The Trust Center running
Residential Mode is used for low security residential applications. Commercial Mode is designed
for high-security commercial applications. In Residential Mode, the Trust Center will allow
devices to join the network, but does not establish keys with the network devices. It therefore
cannot periodically update keys and allows for the memory cost to be minimal, as it cannot scale
with size of the network. In commercial mode, it establishes and maintains keys and freshness
counters with every device in the network, allowing centralized control and update of keys. This
results in a memory cost that could scale with the size of the network. There are three types of
keys employed, the Master Key, the Link Key and the Network Key. Master keys are installed
ﬁrst, either in the factory or out of band. They are sent from the Trust Center and are the
basis for long-term security between two devices. The Link key is a basis of security between
two devices and the Network keys are the basis of security across the entire network. Link and
Network keys, which are either installed in the factory or out of band, employ symmetrical key-
key exchange (SKKE) handshake between devices. The key is transported from the Trust Center
for both types of keys. This operation occurs in commercial mode, as residential mode does not
allow for authentication.
In the latest protocol, SM (Security Manager), a new method of key agreement has been
proposed in [9], whereby, when a new device joins a network, the Security Manager (SM) gives
static domain parameters at the base station such as the order of the curve and the elliptic
curve coeﬃcients. After calculating a public key using the base point and a private key, the
device sends a public key to the SM. Therefore the SM would have the public key list for all
the devices in the network. Authentication is achieved by using either Diﬃe-Hellman or Elliptic
Curve Equation. Conﬁdentiality is achieved by using message authentication protocol. This
shows that SM protocol oﬀers more services than the other existing protocols.
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4 Proposed Protocol
A security protocol refers to a set of rules governing the interaction between peer processes to
provide a certain type of security service. We propose a new security protocol. Security Manager
(SM) [9] does not guarantee data freshness; and so, we suggest a protocol to make up for the
weakness of SM. This provides a solution to maintain data freshness by checking the message
sequence number. When the message is sent, it is checked by the message sequence number
whether it is already sent or not. If the message is old then no need to send that message. By
this way, we can reduce overhead. By reducing the overhead we can make the protocol more
eﬃcient. Authentication and conﬁdentiality are also provided. Authentication is deﬁned to
provide assurance about the originator of a message. This prevents an attacker from mimicking
the operation of another device in any attempt to compromise the network.
Conﬁdentiality means keeping information secret from unauthorized parties. The standard
solution to keep sensitive data secret is to encrypt the data with a secret key that only the
intended receivers possess, hence achieving conﬁdentiality.
Additionally, this protocol provides freshness through the use of freshness checks. These
checks prevent replay attacks, as devices maintain incoming and outgoing messages. Whenever
a node wants to send message, message sequence number will be checked.
One of the many attacks launched against sensor networks is the message replay attack where
an adversary may capture messages exchanged between nodes and replay them later to cause
confusion to the network. Data freshness implies that the data is recent, and it ensures that
an adversary has not replayed old messages. To achieve freshness, network protocols must be
designed in a way to identify duplicate packets and discard them preventing potential mix-up.
This extra feature shows that proposed protocol oﬀers more security services than the existing
one.
In the proposed protocol, time interval t accounts for request time, response time, delay,
as shown in (1) and (2). Freshness is computed as the diﬀerence between the time a data item
is generated and the time it is received at the sink.
With data freshness,
t = tRq + tRs +d+ t (1)
Without data freshness,
t = tRq + tRs +d (2)
Where tRq = request transmission, tRs = response transmission, d = sum of delays (delays
in transmission and propagation), t = time when message sequence number is checked. In case
of without data freshness, no message is checked.
Accuracy is measured as the ratio of total number of messages received at the sink to the
total number of messages generated. In case of without data freshness, no message is discarded
but in case of with data freshness the message, which is already sent then no need to send again.
Therefore, the ratio of without data freshness is always one but it is less than one in case of with
data freshness. We can calculate the packet ratio by (3) and (4) as follows:
Without data freshness,
PacketRatio = send=receive = 1 (3)
With data freshness,
PacketRatio = send=receive < 1 (4)
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5 Results and Discussion
Sensor network is a promising and upcoming technology with usage in important applications.
The resource constraint hardware, specialized software, low energy devices and hostile environ-
ment makes the security in wireless sensor networks a challenging task as and when compared
to the traditional computer networks.
Energy eﬃciency can be achieved by reducing the number of packets transmitted. Without
data freshness, each node will send a packet that will be forwarded to the sink whereas with data
freshness no need to send all packets, this reduced number of packets transmitted improve the
eﬃciency. Figure 1 shows the average latency. In case of with data freshness, average latency
is constant as the number of nodes is increased while it is increased in case of without data
freshness.
Figure 1: Number of nodes vs. Average Latency
Figure 2 shows the average packet delivery ratio. In case of with data freshness, average
packet ratio is 100% because how many packets sent will deﬁnitely be received but in case of
without data freshness some may already sent. This reduced number of packet transmitted also
improves the eﬃciency.
The discussion of the security protocol and authentication mechanism allow for the con-
struction of comparison table as in given Table 1, where they can be compared under similar
headings. It can be seen from the table that new protocol is better than the existing protocol
and oﬀers more security services than the earliest one.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, ﬁrstly we propose a new security protocol for wireless sensor network. Sec-
ondly, we compared the performances of all the existing protocol with proposed protocol. SPIN
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Figure 2: Number of nodes vs. Packet Delivery Ratio
Table 1: Security Architecture Comparison
Protocol / Service C F I Ava IA A
SPIN YES YES YES NO YES NO
LEAP YES NO NO NO YES NO
TINYSEC YES NO NO - YES YES
ZIGBEE YES YES YES NO YES YES
SM YES NO NO - YES YES
OUR PROTOCOL YES YES - - YES YES
C=Conﬁdentiality, F=Freshness, I=Integrity, Ava=Availability,
IA=Implicit Authentication, A=Authentication of user
was found to perform better in smaller size networks because of its eﬃciency and high latency
properties. The use of SPIN in large scale networks could potentially exhaust system resources
in a much faster pace. Our protocol has one extra feature i.e. freshness. Freshness reduces the
overhead. This extra feature shows that this is superior to the existing protocols. This also
improves the eﬃciency.
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